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The number of commercial farms declared bankrupt in South Africa rose sharply over the
period 1948 to 1994. Aggregate farm bankruptcies rose from 18 farms (0,016 percent of all
farms) in 1948 to 389 farms in 1994 (0,632 percent of all farms). The number of bankrupt
maize farms increased from 16 to around 150 farms per year over the period 1970 to 1994,
while the number of bankrupt extensive beef farms increased from 12 to about 50 per year
over the same period. The objective of this study is to analyse factors affecting bankruptcies
of aggregate farm bankruptcy during 1948 to 1994 maize and extensive beef farm bankruptcy
from 1970 to 1994.
Possible causes of farm bankruptcy include both business and financial risk factors. Business
risk factors (inherent in a business and its operating environment, regardless of the way the
business is financed) include drought, fluctuations in producer prices and changes in real
government subsidies to agriculture. Financial risk factors (associated with debt financing)
are reflected by variable real interest rates and the level of the aggregate farm debt/asset
ratio. Principal components regression confirmed a priori theoretical expectations of farm
bankruptcy determinants.
The aggregate farm bankruptcy rate was positively related to the lagged aggregate farm
debt/asset ratio and lagged real interest rates (financial risk factors), but negatively related
to a lagged drought index (lower index values reflected drought) and lagged real government
subsidies to agriculture (business risk factors). Maize and extensive beef farm bankruptcies
were negatively related to lagged annual rainfall (business risk factor), but positively related
(ii)
to the lagged aggregate farm debt/asset ratio and lagged real interest rates (financial risk
factors). Lagged real maize and beef producer prices (business risk factors) were negatively
related to bankruptcy among maize farmers. Beef farm bankruptcies rose with lower lagged
real beef producer prices and higher lagged real stockfeed subsidies and transport rebates
(business risk factors).
These results show that farm bankruptcy in South Africa is a dynamic process, with time lags
between business and financial risk factors and ultimate farm bankruptcy. The aggregate,
maize and extensive beef farm bankruptcy models also suggest that the rise in farm
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INTRODUCTION
The annual rate of bankruptcy amongst commercial farms in South Africa rose from
approximately 0,016 percent of all farms in 1948 (18 farms) to 0,632 percent in 1994 (389
farms) (Directorate Agricultural Economic Trends, 1971 and 1995; Central Statistical
Service, 1964, 1972, 1994 and 1995). The annual number of commercial maize and
extensive beef farms declared bankrupt in South Africa also rose sharply in the period 1970
to 1994. Bankrupt maize farms increased from 16 to around 150 farms per year over this
period, while bankrupt extensive beef farms increased from 12 to about 50 per year (Van
Niekerk, 1995). In 1988, there were about 7 500 maize farms and 2 500 extensive livestock
farms in the summer rainfall and cattle grazing regions of South Africa respectively (Central
Statistical Service, 1988a and 1988£; Directorate Agricultural Statistics, 1996: 110). While
the rate of bankruptcies is relatively low, the marked rise in the number of bankrupt farms,
particularly since the early 1980s, is of concern.
Maize is the major field crop in South Africa comprising some 40 percent by value of all
field crops, and about nine percent of the gross value of all agricultural products in 1994/95.
Beef constituted approximately 37 percent of the gross value of animal products, and
approximately 11 percent of the total gross value of agricultural production in 1994/95
(Directorate Agricultural Statistics, 1996). Therefore, maize and extensive beef farm
bankruptcies impose major adjustment costs on the agricultural economy and give rise to
demands for government assistance to alleviate financial stress for farmers. Farm failure is
a costly process for individual farm operators (loss of employment) and for the rural
economy. Farm capital assets are neither perfectly mobile nor perfectly fungible, therefore
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farm bankruptcy entails economic losses (Leathers and Chavas, 1986). Substantial
government involvement generally arises when a large number of farming operations are
threatened with bankruptcy. For example, nominal subsidies on farm carry-over debt in
South Africa in 1992/93 totalled R2,7 billion (Directorate Financial Assistance, 1996).
Given that farm debt is concentrated in the maize and extensive beef sectors (Volkskas Bank,
1988; Human, 1989), research into why these farmers fail can help to identify appropriate
future policy and management measures to cope with farm failure.
Commercial farmers in South Africa experience both business and financial risk. Business
risk refers to risk inherent in a business independent of the way the business is financed and
is reflected in variability of net operating income. It arises from factors such as price
variability in both output and input markets. Financial risk reflects added variability of net
cash flows due to fixed financial obligations associated with debt financing (Gabriel and
Baker, 1980). As no published local study has yet analysed causes of farm bankruptcy at an
aggregate or product sector level, this study, using annual data for the period 1948 to 1994,
considers sources of business and financial risk which may have caused farm bankruptcies
in South Africa to rise.
The study is presented in the following format: Chapter 1 first defines bankruptcy terms and
reviews the incidence and studies of farm bankruptcies in certain developed countries to put
the local analysis into perspective. This chapter then examines past South African farm
financial stress studies and aggregate, maize and extensive beef farm bankruptcy in South
Africa. Past agricultural finance policy in South Africa is then reviewed. Chapter 2 outlines
hypothesised determinants of farm bankruptcy in South Africa. These determinants are
separated into business and financial risk factors. Chapter 3 presents the research
methodology and results for the aggregate, maize and extensive beef farm bankruptcy
models. The concluding section discusses management and policy implications of the results.
CHAPTER 1
LITERATURE REVIEW AND INCIDENCE OF FARM BANKRUPTCY
This chapter first defines farm bankruptcy terms. It then reviews past literature on farm
bankruptcies, focusing on studies conducted in the developed world, to determine what
factors influence farm bankruptcies. This overview of research into farm bankruptcy and
factors influencing bankruptcy will put the local analysis into perspective. The third section
outlines South African farm financial stress studies and the incidence of, and trends in,
commercial farm bankruptcy in South Africa. A final section summarises past agricultural
policy in South Africa.
1.1 Definition of farm bankruptcy terms
There are several terms used interchangeably in this study. Bankruptcy is defined by Barry
et al. (1995: 557) as "a legal process of either reorganising an insolvent business or
liquidating the business and distributing the sale proceeds to creditors". Similarly, Walker
(1980: 111) defines bankruptcy as "the proceeding whereby the state, acting through an
officer appointed for the purpose, takes the property of a debtor so that it may be realised
and, subject to certain preferable claims and priorities, distributed ratably among his
creditors".
Insolvency is defined by Walker (1980: 624) as "the state of inability to pay debts in full and
by itself has no legal consequences. In England the filing of a declaration of inability to pay
5
debts is an act of bankruptcy". Curzon (1979: 31) describes bankruptcy as "compulsory
administration of the estate of an insolvent person (known as a bankrupt) by the court for the
benefit of his creditors". According to Milton (1995), insolvency in South Africa is classed
as an act of bankruptcy.
Sequestration is defined by Walker (1980: 1132) as the removal, by judicial authority, of
property in possession of it, and includes the situation where "an insolvent's property is taken
out of his hands in order that no creditor may secure an unfair preference, but so the whole
may be administered by a trustee for the benefit of the whole body of creditors". This is
commonly called 'bankruptcy'. In South Africa, farm sector bankruptcy data are given in
terms of 'number of sequestrations', and aggregate data in terms of 'number of insolvencies'.
Therefore, for the purposes of this study, these terms are used synonymously with 'number
of bankruptcies'.
The definition of financial stress is also important, as extreme financial stress leads to farm
bankruptcy. Brake (1983) deems financial stress to be a cash flow concept, but it is possible
for a financially healthy farm to experience periodic short-term liquidity problems. Financial
stress over the long-term is characterised by a negative real return to equity. A negative
return will deplete net worth over time, resulting in eventual termination of the business
(Boesson et ai, 1990).
1.2 Farm bankruptcies in some developed countries
During the post-World War II period, farm bankruptcies in the United States (US) increased
from 3,8 failures per 100 000 farms in 1949 to 26,3 in 1978 (Shepard and Collins, 1982).
The farm bankruptcy rate in 1978 approached the rate prevailing in the 1930s. In 1985, one-
third of commercial farms in the US with sales of more than $50 000 were either technically
insolvent or facing serious financial problems which could lead to insolvency (Shepard,
1986).
Shepard and Collins (1982) studied aggregate US farm sector bankruptcy data over the period
1910 to 1978, and attempted to establish broad classes of variables in order to answer the
question "Why do farmers fail?". An econometric model was formulated with the annual
rate of farm bankruptcy as the dependent variable. Independent variables included real net
farm income, average farm size, leverage, real interest rates, non-farm bankruptcy rates, real
government support payments and liquidity. Analysis of aggregate time series data suggests
that independent variables explained much of the variation in US farm bankruptcy rates and,
prior to World War II, the farm bankruptcy rate appeared to be linked with financial risk
(leverage), while postwar bankruptcy was associated with business risk factors (variation in
farm incomes and farm size). Pressure has been placed on US farm incomes since World
War II due to falling food prices caused by relatively greater technology-induced productivity
increases compared to increases in demand. As farm size increased, economies of scale
needed to be achieved, hence overheads and risk were also raised. Agricultural support
payments since World War II did not induce, defer or reduce farm failures.
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Rucker and Alston (1987) investigated the link between farm failures and government
intervention in the US in the 1930s. Owing to a lack of data in the 1980s, no empirical work
has been conducted on the effects of federal and state policies on failure rates in the US.
However, Rucker and Alston (1987) estimated the effects on farm bankruptcy rates during
the 1930s of (1) commodity programmes of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, (2)
the expanded role of the federal government in the agricultural credit market, and (3)
moratorium legislation passed by 25 states in the early 1930s. The 1920s and 1930s saw
farm failure rates higher than in the 1980s. Estimates indicate that each programme was
important in reducing farm failures, and in total between 146 000 and 278 000 farms were
saved from failure. Therefore, their empirical results were consistent with the hypothesis
that government programmes successively alleviated farm financial stress in the 1930s. Also,
government programmes imposed direct costs and less apparent efficiency costs on the
economy.
A multidimensional measure of agricultural financial stress in the US was developed by
Shonkwiler and Moss (1993). By examining the common variation in financial stress
indicators, they were able to compare the level of financial stress in the 1980s with that of
the 1930s. In their study, four factors (inflation rate, unemployment rate, ratio of debt
payments to farm equity, and the current rate of return on farm assets) were combined to
form a single measure of farm stress using factor analysis. Both the 1930s and the 1980s
were associated with indexes substantially less than zero, indicating severe financial stress.
In Canada, the number of farm bankruptcies increased substantially in all regions of the
country, from 125 in 1979 to 551 in 1984 and then remained high at 440 in 1986 (Chan and
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Rotenberg, 1988). Chan and Rotenberg (1988) examined determinants of financial stress and
the incidence of bankruptcy in the Canadian agricultural sector. They found that (1) regional
effects do not play an important role in explaining farm bankruptcies across Canada, and (2)
aggregate financial data are useful in analysing trends in the incidence of farm bankruptcy.
Empirical work identified financial leverage and energy-related expenses as key causes of
farm loan arrears and ultimate bankruptcy in Canada during 1979 to 1986.
In Chan and Rotenberg's (1988) study, there was a time lag between entering financial stress
and ultimate farm failure. It appeared to take up to four years for financially stressed farms
to go bankrupt. Farm failures increased with the level of loan arrears in the previous year.
Loan arrears two years earlier were negatively related to farm failure. This may indicate the
structure of farm assistance programmes and other institutional provisions.
For the United Kingdom (UK), Harrison and Tranter (1994) report 50 bankruptcies of self-
employed individuals in agriculture in 1980 and 277 in 1993. They attribute the prime cause
of the deterioration in farming income to adverse movements in the industry's terms of trade
(product prices relative to input prices), especially on capital inputs. The number of farm
bankruptcies were, however, lower in 1993 compared to 1992. Despite large expenditures
on agricultural support in the European Union, farmers continue to fail. Davies (1996) found
that the annual rate of insolvency in agriculture in England and Wales from 1969 to 1986 was
negatively related to the current price of land, but positively related to the land price two
years previously. Past Common Agricultural Policy price supports, which were capitalised
into higher land values that encouraged farmers to use more debt, were thus partly
responsible for higher insolvency. The implication of this study is that not all farm failures
can be attributed to poor management.
In New Zealand, Johnston and Frengley (1990) observed that the percentage of all farms that
were identified as high-debt farms (equity less than 50 percent) increased from six percent
in 1984 to approximately 24 percent in 1986. About 10 percent of high-debt farms,
equivalent to about two percent of all sheep and beef farms, had zero or negative equities in
1987.
Therefore, all the developed countries reviewed showed an increasing trend in farm
bankruptcies in the late 1970s, continuing through to the 1980s. The next section reviews
past farm financial stress in South Africa and the incidence of farm bankruptcy in the
commercial farming sector.
1.3 Farm bankruptcies in South Africa
1.3.1 South African farm financial stress studies
De Jager and Swanepoel (1994) used a logit model to distinguish between producers in the
Northern Springbok Flats who had failed financially and those who were financially
successful during 1990. Failed farmers had (1) higher directly allocatable costs, (2)
relatively higher levels of carry-over debt (proportion of production debt received from co-
operatives which is not repaid and so carried forward to the next production season), (3)
higher arrears on instalments on long-term loans (liquidity problems), (4) less land as
collateral, (5) lower gross farm incomes in relation to long-term debt, and (6) bought land
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in the 1980s. In addition to an insolvent farm being labelled a failure, a farmer would also
be classified as having failed financially if consolidation or settlement arrangements had been
negotiated with the Department of Agriculture.
Van Zyl et al. (1987a) found that the initial farm solvency position, nominal interest rates
and inflation all affected the survival of 'typical' Western Transvaal and North-Western
Transvaal Bushveld farms. Van Zyl et al. (1987&) used multiple regression analysis to
identify how drought, general economic conditions and structural inflation affect the debt
burden of the agricultural sector. The real debt burden of agriculture was highly responsive
to changes in a drought index, volume of field crop production, real gross national product
(GNP), the ratio of input to output prices and interest rates in the period 1970 to 1985. A
change in any of these factors would lead to a proportionately larger change in real total debt
burden.
Leslie and Darroch (1993) allocated financial stress into income and debt components for
selected Natal and Eastern Orange Free State (EOFS) farms. Leverage ratios and interest
rates were compared for farms experiencing financial stress (negative long-term real return
to equity) with a target leverage ratio and interest rate for those farms which were financially
successful (positive long-term rate of return to equity). They reported that successful farms
had higher rates of return to assets and equity and lower costs of debt than unsuccessful
farms. Rates of return to assets on successful farms exceeded costs of debt, implying
positive use of leverage. Reliance on dryland cropping enterprises could explain why
financially stressed EOFS farms were less successful than their Natal counterparts. The
Natal farms relied on livestock enterprises for an average of 81 percent of their total income
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while dairy enterprises comprised 61 percent. Given that a dairy enterprise has a relatively
consistent cash flow, ceteris paribus, financial stress should be less prevalent for this group.
Successful EOFS farms were more diversified than the unsuccessful EOFS farms, probably
comprising of a better mix of summer and winter crops. However, some financially stressed
EOFS farms were also more diversified, indicating that poor financial management ability
may have led to financial problems. This could indicate poor financial managerial ability.
Leslie and Darroch (1993) emphasise that an understanding of the relationship between return
on assets, interest rates and leverage is critical when deciding what proportion of debt a farm
can safely utilise.
1.3.2 Incidence and trends in South African farm bankruptcy: 1948-1994
Figure 1.1 shows the rate of farm bankruptcies in South Africa from 1948 to 1994 using
aggregate data. The number of bankruptcies in year t is expressed as a percentage of the
total number of farms in year t. This gives a relative measure of farm bankruptcy because
farm numbers fluctuate due to several reasons, such as, voluntarily exit from farming. No
census data were available for the number of farms in 1966, 1970, 1977, 1982, 1984, 1989,
1993 and 1994. For these missing data, the mean of the adjacent years was taken as a
reasonable proxy, and for 1993 and 1994 the number of bankruptcies for 1992 was used
(Du Toit, 1996).
The aggregate bankruptcy rate has increased since the mid-1950s with notable rises in 1962
and 1978, a large increase from 1984 to 1987 and then another major rise from 1989 to
1991, continuing to 1994. Possible explanations for the marked rise since the early 1980s
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Figure 1.1 Aggregate farm bankruptcy rate in South Africa: 1948-1994 (Directorate
Agricultural Economic Trends, 1971 and 1995; Central Statistical Service, 1964, 1972, 1994
and 1995).
include periodic droughts (1983, 1984 and in the 1990s) and an increase in real interest rates.
The farm bankruptcy rate shows greater variation since 1980 compared to the period 1948
to 1970.
In Figure 1.2, trends in annual maize and extensive farm bankruptcies in South Africa are
shown during 1970 to 1994 for the areas defined by the Directorate Agricultural Statistics
(1996: 110) as summer rainfall and cattle grazing areas respectively (no annual data on the
total number of maize and beef farms in the designated areas were available). Maize farm
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bankruptcies rose from 16 in 1970 to 206 farms by 1986 and then fluctuated around the 150
farm level. Bankrupt extensive beef farms followed a similar pattern, rising from two farms
in 1971 to 62 farms in 1987, fluctuating around the 50 farm level during 1988 to 1992, and
then falling to 35 farms in 1994. The absolute number of extensive beef farm bankruptcies
was lower than that of maize farm bankruptcies. Extensive beef farm bankruptcies appear
to lag one period behind the maize farm bankruptcies. Changes in government policy (for
example, on interest rates) may have affected the farm sectors differently.
250
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Figure 1.2 Maize and extensive beef farm bankruptcy trends in South Africa: 1970-1994
(Directorate Agricultural Economic Trends, 1995; Central Statistical Service, 1994 and 1995;
Van Niekerk, 1995).
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Before analysing the determinants of farm bankruptcy, it is appropriate to briefly describe
the role of the Land Bank and other sources of farm finance in the past. The system of farm
financing in South Africa has undergone major changes since the 1980s and this appears to
have had an effect on farm bankruptcy.
1.3.3 Past agricultural finance policy in South Africa
The Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa was established in 1912 to provide for the
special financing needs of agriculture. A further development in the financing of agriculture
was the creation of control boards and agricultural co-operatives in the 1930s (Johnson, 1989;
Jacobs, 1985). Credit was lent by the Land Bank direct to farmers and to fanners via these
co-operatives at relatively low interest rates.
The De Kock Commission found the pattern of agricultural financing through the Land Bank
to have undesirable consequences for monetary policy implementation (Human, 1989;
Johnson, 1989). This is because the system of allowing Land Bank bills, debentures and
advances to qualify as liquid assets, resulted in the activities of the Land Bank exerting a
strong influence on the increase in monetary aggregates and hence the level and structure of
interest rates.
The practice whereby the Reserve Bank provided part of the Land Bank's funds with which
agricultural co-operatives were supplied with short-term credit was phased out before 1985.
The provision of credit to the Land Bank then took place at market-related interest rates via
the issue of negotiable credit instruments (Jacobs, 1985). Also, since mid-1982, market-
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related interest rates were increasingly applied in the economy (Jacobs, 1984).
Land Bank debentures were also no longer considered to be liquid assets after 1 August
1988. Land bank bills qualify under more restrictive conditions. The status change in these
instruments meant that certain sources of Land Bank financing became more expensive than
in the past. This adjustment is reflected in higher financing costs since 1988 which are
ultimately borne by the farmer (Human, 1989). In South Africa, agricultural debt is
becoming increasingly short-term, resulting in monetary policy having an increasing impact
on farmers who must borrow capital. In the changing agricultural financing system of South
Africa, higher demands will be made on the financial management skills of farmers (Human,
1989; Jacobs, 1985).
Recent financial aid to commercial farmers in South Africa consisted of a number of different
aid packages, the most important being an interest subsidy on carry-over debt in 1992/93 of
R2,7 billion (Directorate Financial Assistance, 1996). Other financial assistance schemes
included interest subsidies on production credit, long-term loans at financial institutions, farm
bonds and consolidated agricultural debt, loans for purchase of production means, subsidies
oa farm bond and consolidated agricultural debt interest, subsidies for flood disaster and fire
damage, stockfeed purchases and incentives, and subsidies for prevention of sequestration.
Important financing and assistance in terms of special relief schemes included; Special
Section 34 seasonal loans to drought-stricken sugar growers in 1980, 1983, 1992 and 1993;
drought relief schemes (summer rainfall areas) from 1978 to 1981, from 1983 to 1987, and
in 1988 (summer and winter rainfall areas); flood relief schemes in 1988; drought relief
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schemes (winter rainfall areas) in 1989; financing purchase of breeding stock in drought
stricken areas in 1992; and mortgage bond emergency aid scheme for pineapple growers in
the Eastern Cape in 1994 (Land Bank, various years).
Reviews of relevant studies conducted in developed countries and South Africa identify some
determinants of farm financial stress and bankruptcy. Chapter 2 builds on past research and
specifies farm bankruptcy variables which may be relevant to the South African situation.
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CHAPTER 2
DETERMINANTS OF FARM BANKRUPTCY
This chapter outlines hypothesised determinants of commercial farm bankruptcy in South
Africa. Determinants are separated into business and financial risk factors.
2.1 Business risk factors
2.1.1 Product and input prices
Success or failure in farming is closely linked to prevailing trends in output and input prices.
Farmers are usually debtors and this makes them vulnerable to a decline in farm product
prices (Tomek and Robinson, 1991: 179; Tweeten, 1985: 78). Variable product and input
prices can impact on farm failure rates by producing wide fluctuations in farm income
(liquidity effects). Lower real net farm income is likely to increase bankruptcy rates
(Shepard and Collins, 1982). Reliable net farm income data for the maize and beef farm
sectors were not available, hence product prices were used as proxy for net farm income.
Real input prices since 1970 have remained relatively stable (Directorate Agricultural
Statistics, 1996). A negative relationship between real producer prices and farm bankruptcy
is expected. In this analysis, producer prices are adjusted to real terms using the Consumer
Price Index (CPI) (1990= 100). Real world prices of both beef and maize showed a similar
declining trend to real beef and maize prices in South Africa (International Monetary Fund,
1995; Directorate Agricultural Statistics, 1996), with the South African prices lagging
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approximately one period behind world prices. This indicates pressure from world prices
on local agricultural policy pricing decisions.
In South Africa, an added risk dimension affecting maize farm incomes would be the fall in
real maize producer prices since the 1987/88 marketing year when Maize Board pricing
policy changed and losses on export sales were reflected in lower fixed real net maize
producer prices (Faminow and Laubscher, 1991). The Board administered a single-channel
pool price maize marketing system until 1995, whereby farmers had to market maize grain
via the Board or its agents. The real producer price of maize set by the Maize Board in
South Africa declined from R350/ton to R290/ton between 1987/88 and 1993/94.
Maize farmers in the summer rainfall area derive some 30 percent of gross farm income
from beef cattle (Central Statistical Service, 1992) which can be sold to provide liquidity in
times of financial stress. A negative relationship between real maize and beef producer
prices and maize farm bankruptcy is thus expected. In the cattle grazing areas, maize grain
is not an important feed input (Directorate Agricultural Economics, 1994: 175). Winter feed
supplementation for beef in this type of extensive system is normally in the form of hay




In order to study the effect of drought on farm bankruptcies, it is necessary to define the
term 'drought'. In this study, a meterological drought (when rainfall is abnormally low) will
be classed as an agricultural drought (when soil moisture is depleted to the extent that crop
yields are reduced considerably) (Dent et ah, 1987). Drought is expected to increase
bankruptcies by reducing net cash flows. Farm earnings can impact on farm failure rates
because of possible wide farm income fluctuations (liquidity effects). Lower real farm
incomes appear to coincide with increases in bankruptcy rates (Shepard and Collins, 1982).
Particularly severe drought conditions occurred in the summer rainfall and extensive beef
areas in 1982, 1990, 1991 and 1992 (CCWR, 1996). Deviations of total production from
trend give an indication of random weather shocks for South Africa as a whole. The weather
variable is estimated by the residuals obtained from a regression of annual total agricultural
production volume index on time shown in Figure 2.1. Random variations in production are
due mainly to agro-climatic reasons (Islam and Subramanian, 1989). These residuals are
expected to be negatively correlated with aggregate farm bankruptcy.
For the farm sector analyses (maize and extensive beef sectors), annual rainfall figures
(calendar year totals) were used. Drought maps were overlaid on economic data maps, and
mean rainfall data for homogeneous relative drought severity regions were calculated in the
relevant areas (Zucchini and Adamson, 1984; CCWR, 1996). This procedure was
undertaken to ensure that the rain gauge totals were not anomalous for the defined summer
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BANKRUPTCY RATE PROD INDEX RESIDUAL
Figure 2.1 Aggregate farm bankruptcy rate and total production index residuals in South
Africa: 1948-1994 (Directorate Agricultural Economic Trends, 1971 and 1995; Central
Statistical Service, 1964, 1972, 1994 and 1995).
In Figure 2.1, major negative deviations from the trend occurred in 1973, 1983 and 1992,
reflecting drought conditions. From about the mid-1960s to 1981, there appears to be an
upward trend in the total production index residuals. From 1981 onwards, a decline in this
trend is evident, corresponding with a sharp increase in the farm bankruptcy rate; adverse
weather conditions appeared to increase the farm bankruptcy rate. These negative total
production index residuals partly reflect the impact of drought on intensive crop production
practices and cattle grazing areas.
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2.1.3 Agricultural Policy
Government support, such as drought relief schemes, can improve farm liquidity by reducing
current liabilities and hence the prospects of short-term survival (Standard Bank, 1994).
Rucker and Alston (1987) found that government programmes successfully alleviated farm
financial stress in the 1930s in the US. Decreased government support has possible costs;
if, for example, future farm policy is more market orientated with reduced credit
programmes, then private lenders and farmers are likely to feel the effects of future farm
recessions more acutely (Drabenstott, 1983). Gabriel and Baker (1980) suggest that policies
reducing business risk increase financial risk through greater borrowing, ceteris paribus.
They propose that business risk and financial risk are trade-offs in a farmer's risk behaviour.
Therefore, a decline in business risk would lead to the acceptance of a greater financial risk,
thus reducing the effects of diminished risk on total risk.
Featherstone et al. (1988) and Collins (1985) suggest that risk-reducing and income-
augmenting agricultural policies (for example, the Commodity Credit Corporation loan
programmes in the US) increase the optimal leverage ratio. This increases the variance of
the rate of return on equity. Risk-reducing and income-augmenting farm policies may
increase the probability of partial or total equity losses by the farmer due to a policy-induced
leverage increase. Credit programmes that increase credit availability may augment the
policy-related leverage increases, raising debt use and the likelihood of farm failure.
Stockfeed purchase subsidies paid to extensive beef farmers in South Africa since 1965 may
have promoted more intensive production in higher risk production areas. Stockfeed
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transport rebates to these farmers could have caused production over time to relocate away
from areas where beef had a comparative advantage in production (Nieuwoudt, 1985).
Therefore, a positive relationship is anticipated between bankruptcy and lagged real stockfeed
purchase subsidies and transport rebates. Annual subsidies were adjusted to real terms using
the change in the CPI (1990 = 100) (Directorate Agricultural Statistics, 1996). It is
paradoxical that policies intended to make farming less risky, may have led to more risk for
farmers in the long-term (Featherstone et al, 1988).
Pasour (1990: 193) highlights some important effects of subsidised credit. The immediate
effect is to reduce real interest rates and increase credit use in agriculture. The reduction in
real interest rates has led to increased production and a trend towards larger and more highly
mechanised farms. Subsidised credit is harmful to non-users of this credit because it
increases output, decreases product prices and increases land prices. In Federal credit
programmes, there is no standard measure of performance to assess their success. As a
result of having no profit bench-mark, there is no objective procedure to determine how
much credit should be used in agriculture. Incentive and information problems arise when
credit decisions are made through the collective-choice process.
If farm policy reduced financial hardship in the agricultural sector, then an inverse
relationship between farm bankruptcy rates and the portion of farm income from government
supports is expected. If government supports respond mainly to adverse economic conditions
in the agricultural sector, farm supports will tend to be greatest in years of high agricultural
bankruptcy. It is possible that government supports in one year may forestall bankruptcies
in the same year, delaying bankruptcies to later years. Therefore, a positive relationship is
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expected between bankruptcy rates and lagged support levels in the long-term.
In the aggregate farm bankruptcy models, government subsidies to agriculture are
approximated by the amount of financial support allocated for wheat (bread subsidies), maize
(distribution margin, import losses and partial redemption of loans), dairy, fertilisers and
stockfeed (purchases, transport rebates and incentives for reduction of stock under different
disaster drought assistance schemes) (Directorate Agricultural Economic Trends, 1971 and
1995; Directorate Agricultural Statistics, 1996). This proxy is used because no aggregate
subsidy data for agriculture are available prior to 1984 (MacVicar, 1996; Steenkamp, 1996).
In Figure 2.2, real government agricultural subsidies rose between 1948 and 1955, fell in the
late 1950s and rose again from about 1960. They fluctuated around R800 million for the
period 1970 to 1983, and then increased to a peak of some Rl 100 million in 1984. From
1985 to 1994, real subsidies fell from Rl 100 million to R100 million, while the aggregate
bankruptcy rate increased markedly. Shepard and Collins (1982) found a significant positive
relationship for the period 1910 to 1940 between US government support payments and farm
bankruptcy (government reacted to economic hardship during the 1930s Depression).
However, after World War II, a negative relationship suggested that the US government
changed economic conditions facing farmers. Agricultural support payments since World
War II did not induce, defer or reduce farm bankruptcies. They suggest that policy makers
may have been more successful in changing, rather than reacting to, agricultural economic
conditions.
When data on subsidies from 1984 to 1994 for interest payments on carry-over debt,
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Figure 2.2 Aggregate farm bankruptcy rate and real agricultural subsidies in South Africa:
1948-1994 (Directorate Agricultural Economic Trends, 1971 and 1995; Central Statistical
Service, 1964, 1972, 1994 and 1995).
production credit, farm bonds, emergency drought schemes and prevention of sequestrations
are added to the subsidy data (REAL COMB SUBSIDIES in Figure 2.3), the same declining
trend in real government subsidies emerges in Figure 2.3, except in 1992/93 (Directorate
Financial Assistance, 1996). Real total subsidies declined from Rl 300 million in 1984 to
R394 million in 1994. This decline was interrupted in 1992/93 by real total subsidies of
some R2,l billion, due mainly to a substantial rise in interest subsidies on farm carry-over
debt. The fall in aggregate, maize and beef farm bankruptcies in 1993 (Figures 1.1 and 1.2)
was probably due to a drought relief package (carry-over debt subsidy and loan guarantee
scheme instalment) in 1992/93 totalling some R3,0 billion in nominal terms (Directorate
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Figure 2.3 Real agricultural subsidies in South Africa: 1985-1994 (Directorate Agricultural
Statistics, 1996; Directorate Financial Assistance, 1996).
Financial Assistance, 1996).
In their study, Rucker and Alston (1987) concluded, firstly, that there is no model of the
optimal level of farm failures, so it cannot be determined whether the government relief
programmes of the Great Depression corrected a 'market failure' or interfered with a
properly functioning market process; secondly, it was not determined if the government
programmes of the 1930s had benefits extending beyond that decade.
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2.2 Financial risk factors
2.2.1 Real interest rates
Expected real interest rates are a critical explanatory variable for investment decisions as they
represent the real cost of borrowing (Mishkin, 1988). In high real interest rate periods,
farmers (particularly those with high leverage levels) are less able to afford additional credit.
Theory suggests a positive relationship between real interest rates and bankruptcy rates
(Shepard and Collins, 1982).
Murdock and Leistritz (1988: 48) identify both direct and indirect effects of high nominal and
real interest rates on agriculture. The direct effects include an increase in interest payments
due from indebted farmers, and a negative impact on land values. Indirect effects include
a higher value of the local currency, as high interest rates in local markets attract capital
from abroad.
High real interest rates transfer wealth from debtors to creditors, placing farmers who are
net debtors at a disadvantage (Tweeten, 1985: 100). In addition, interest rates affect
agriculture directly through cost and stock effects (Devadoss, 1985: 18; Rausser, 1988: 150).
A higher real interest rate will increase finance charges, and therefore the cost of production
will, in turn, decrease farm supply (cost effect). An increase in the real interest rate will
raise the cost of holding stocks causing farmers to run down inventories (stock effect). This
reflects the increased opportunity cost of non-farm investment in interest-bearing assets
(Rausser, 1985: 220; Hughes etai, 1985).
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When real interest rates are expected to be relatively high, farmers should shift from debt
to retained earnings to finance expansion (Drabenstott, 1983). In these periods of tight
money and high interest rates, lenders are less willing to extend loan terms and farmers are
less able to afford additional credit. Low interest rates assist potential bankrupts who acquire
credit to see them through difficult times and prevent foreclosure. High nominal interest
rates create cash flow problems but not necessarily low returns because land values
appreciate with inflation that led to the high nominal interest rates for farmers (Tweeten,
1985: 100).
High real interest rates add to farm expenses and reduce real wealth by increasing the rate
of discount on expected future earnings of durable farm resources, resulting in declining
collateral for loans. The influence of interest rates on investment projects depends on the
timing and magnitude of future cash flows. As a consequence of discounting, raising the
interest rate will increase the rate of earnings on reinvesting the payments and favours those
investments with larger payments coming in sooner (Barry et al., 1995: 277). Changes in
expectations about interest rates affect any decision where the returns are spread over time.
Net present value represents the addition to farmer wealth resulting from the project; a
reduction (increase) in interest rate should increase (decrease) farm sector wealth (Dodson
and Covey, 1993).
In response to the De Kock Commission's recommendation in 1983, monetary policy became
more market-orientated and market-related interest rates were increasingly applied to
agriculture. This subjected the farming sector to a 'double' increase in interest rates; firstly,
from a decline in subsidised interest rates, and secondly, due to the imposition of positive
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real interest rates for the economy as a whole. More market-related rates imply greater
expected interest rate volatility and higher financial risk.
Overdraft interest rates from commercial banks are used as a proxy for market interest rates
in Figure 2.4. Nominal interest rates were obtained from the South African Reserve Bank
(various years) and adjusted to real terms using the change in the CPI (1990=100)
(Directorate Agricultural Economic Trends, 1971 and 1995).
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Figure 2.4 Aggregate farm bankruptcy rate and real interest rates in South Africa: 1948-
1994 (Directorate Agricultural Economic Trends, 1971 and 1995; Central Statistical Service,
1964, 1972, 1994 and 1995; South African Reserve Bank, various years).
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In 1953, the real interest rate rose and positive real interest rates were maintained until 1972.
The aggregate bankruptcy rate increased from the mid-1950s onwards. Real interest rates
generally followed an upward movement from 1949 to the end of the 1960s. Real interest
rates showed relative stability in the 1960s. From the 1970s, short-term interest rates
showed greater variability and more frequent changes in direction. The main reasons for this
change were due to the implementation of new money market instruments and market-related
rates. Previously, short-term interest rates had been adjusted administratively to reflect broad
changes in market conditions (De Kock Commission, 1985: 107).
Nominal interest rates did not keep pace with high rates of inflation in the 1970s, resulting
in negative real interest rates during part of this period. Negative real interest rates reached
a maximum in 1980 (almost the same magnitude as in 1952 - with the relatively high rate of
inflation during the time of the Korean War - also resulting in negative real interest rates)
(De Kock Commission, 1985: 116). From 1973 to 1975 real interest rates were negative.
In the period 1978 to 1980, negative real interest rates were associated with a decrease in the
bankruptcy rate. Annual real overdraft interest rates fell from two percent to around -1,5
percent between 1970 and 1975, rose to one percent over the period 1976 to 1978 and fell
to -4,5 percent by 1980. De Kock Commission recommendations for more market-orientated
commercial and Land Bank interest rates led to historically high real overdraft interest rates
of between five and 10 percent during 1983 to 1985, while positive real rates of up to 6,5
percent have continued since 1988.
Farmers are making more use of outside capital, resulting in the agricultural sector being
more sensitive to interest changes than in previous years. An increase in real interest rates
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is likely to raise farm bankruptcy rates.
2.2.2 Debt/asset (leverage) ratio
The aggregate farm debt/asset (leverage) ratio (total farm debt as a percentage of total farm
assets) shows the solvency and risk-bearing ability of farmers. Leverage can be used to
analyse income or debt service capacity by relating returns on assets to the service
requirements on existing liabilities (Jolly et ai, 1985). Farmers with substantial net worth
or equity have the potential to borrow additional funds to meet short-term needs (Murdock
and Leistritz, 1988: 78). This increases the probability that highly leveraged farmers will
face difficulties in servicing debt (Chan and Rotenberg, 1988). Increasing financial leverage
increases the variation of expected returns on equity and the potential for loss of equity
capital, and reduces liquid credit reserves. Furthermore, variations in interest rates magnify
these financial risks as leverage increases (Barry et al., 1995: 169). The ratio of debt to net
cash income has increased over time, implying that a higher proportion of income must be
used to service debt. This creates cash flow stress (Lins and Duncan, 1980). Leverage and
bankruptcy of commercial farmers are expected to be positively related.
Brake (1983) highlighted two new components of financial stress in 1981 to 1983 compared
to previous periods of stress in the US: (1) The expected ability to borrow periodically on
capital gains disappeared with the reality of asset value decreases (less collateral), and (2),
more importantly, the cash flow required to service previous debt commitments became
substantially larger with rapidly rising nominal interest rates. These were also two new
components in the South African farm financial stress situation.
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Trends in both the aggregate farm debt/asset ratio and farm bankruptcy rate are similar from
1948 to 1994, as shown in Figure 2.5. Both increased for the period 1954 to 1994, with a
large rise in the debt/asset ratio at the start of the 1980s, peaking in 1985 and then remaining
relatively high until 1994. There appears to be a strong positive correlation between the
bankruptcy rate and leverage ratio from 1970 to 1985. High bankruptcy rates during 1991
to 1994 corresponded with high leverage levels.
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Figure 2.5 Aggregate farm bankruptcy rate and the aggregate farm debt/asset ratio in South
Africa: 1948-1994 (Directorate Agricultural Trends, 1971 and 1995; Central Statistical
Service, 1964, 1972, 1994 and 1995).
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Farm sector leverage in South Africa rose from 0,06 in 1970 to a peak of 0,17 in 1985 and
remained around 0,15 in 1994. These relatively 'safe' aggregate leverage levels mask the
distribution of farm debt, which was concentrated in the summer rainfall and cattle grazing
areas over this period (Central Statistical Service, 1972 and 1994; Volkskas Bank, 1988;
Human, 1989).
Fiscal policy has probably played a role in debt accumulation. Favourable accelerated
depreciation allowances on machinery investment, negative real interest rates in the early
1980s and drought in the early 1980s and 1990s are likely to have encouraged use of more
debt. Investing in equipment and land was an attractive alternative to paying income tax.
This probably encouraged borrowing from farm co-operatives and commercial banks and
brought about a level of mechanisation that was economically unsustainable.
Higher real interest rates would reduce asset values and increase the leverage ratio, thereby
reducing solvency and increasing the potential for bankruptcy. This interaction is
incorporated in the models of maize and beef farm bankruptcy specified later. A real return
problem occurs when interest rates remain high and disinflation removes capital gains as a
compensating return (Tweeten, 1985: 87). A high ratio of debt to assets becomes a low
return problem when interest rates exceed total rates of return on assets for an extended
period. Highly leveraged farms are likely to experience cash flow problems because the rate
of return to assets is less than the interest rate that must be paid (Murdock and Leistritz,
1988: 78). Realising this problem, local lenders now place more emphasis on farmer
repayment capacity than on farmer collateral. Farmers must now have the ability to cover
expected production costs, fixed costs, existing commitments (capital and interest) and
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personal expenditures from farm and non-farm income (Louw, 1995).
2.3 Other factors
2.3.1 Non-farm bankruptcies
The non-farm bankruptcy rate reflects general economic conditions which may spill over into
the agricultural sector (Shepard and Collins, 1982). A positive relationship is expected
between farm and non-farm failure rates. However, non-farm bankruptcies are not a direct
cause of farm bankruptcies because certain factors, such as real interest rates, will affect both
sectors.
2.3.2 Economies of size
Larger machinery and equipment, together with increases in value of farmland and in farm
size, raise the capital required to operate a farm (Hughes et al., 1985). This makes farms,
particularly those which are highly leveraged, more vulnerable to bankruptcy. In US
agriculture there has been a concurrent change in capital structure and a shift in size (Shepard
and Collins, 1982). While improved technology and scale in agriculture potentially raise
profits in the short-run, they ultimately raise overheads and risk. This makes farmers more
vulnerable to year-to-year shortfalls in income, potentially raising failure rates (farm
expansion through increased use of debt capital has increased financial vulnerability). Cross-
sectional data are needed to analyse the relationship between farm size and farm bankruptcy
as the relationship is not known a priori.
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2.3.3 Exchange rate
Dushmanitch and Darroch (1990) identified depreciation of the exchange rate and higher
domestic inflation as raising prices for South African imports of capital equipment, fuels,
fertilisers and chemicals. Exchange rates have different effects on different farm sectors
depending on the degree of imports and exports. The effect of changing exchange rates on
farm bankruptcy is not known a priori, and there is a close interrelationship between interest
rates and spot and forward exchange rates (De Kock Commission, 1985: Al l ) . Therefore,
the exchange rate was not considered as one of the possible determinants of farm bankruptcy
in this study.
2.3.4 Inflation rate
Shonkwiler and Moss (1993) recognise inflation as having different effects on individuals,
depending on the mix of financial and physical assets and their position as net debtors and
creditors. Starleaf et al. (1985) found that farmers have been net beneficiaries of
unanticipated increases in the inflation rate. An unanticipated increase in the rate of general
price inflation benefits those whose money incomes are flexible (farmers), for example,
varying prices received for produce, at the expense of those whose money incomes are fixed.
Unanticipated inflation transfers real wealth from creditors to debtors but does not have a
large effect on total real wealth (Tweeten, 1985: 100). Variables considered in the
bankruptcy models were deflated using the CPI (1990 = 100).
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2.3.5 Principal-agent relationship (moral hazard and adverse selection)
In a credit relationship the lender (the principal) contracts with the borrower (the agent) to
productively utilise and repay with interest the lender's funds. During the course of the loan
contract, the borrower is expected to comply with the objectives of the lender so that these
objectives can be optimally obtained. There are two vital questions (Barry et al., 1995:
197): firstly, is the borrower a greater risk than believed when the loan contract was drawn
up (an adverse selection problem)? Secondly, will the borrower take on greater risks during
the term of the loan contract than anticipated by the lender when the contract was established
(a moral hazard problem)? The more prevalent these problems are, the greater the expected
rate of bankruptcy. It is not possible to build this factor into the farm bankruptcy models on
an aggregate basis, as this information is not available.
2.4 Time lag before bankruptcy
There is likely to be a time lag between the incidence of business and financial risk factors
and ultimate farm bankruptcy. For example, drought and higher interest rates in one year
will affect borrowers' future ability to meet debt repayments, as they reduce present income
(and possibly savings) and raise the commitments against future income (Rucker and Alston,
1987). Similarly, Chan and Rotenberg (1988) found that a time lag occurred between
entering financial stress and ultimate failure, with up to four years before an increase in loan
arrears was fully reflected in bankruptcy statistics. Lagged proxy variables for business and
financial risk in the farm bankruptcy models estimated in Chapter 3 are used to indicate that
the bankruptcy process is dynamic.
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Past research and economic theory identify product prices, adverse weather conditions, real
interest rates and the aggregate farm debt/asset ratio as possible quantifiable determinants of
bankruptcy amongst commercial fanners in South Africa. These variables are considered in
the econometric models developed in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
Factors affecting aggregate farm bankruptcy from 1948 to 1994, and bankruptcy of
aggregate, maize and extensive beef farmers during the period 1970 to 1994 were estimated
from time series data using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and principal component
analysis. Regional sequestration data were obtained for the summer rainfall and cattle
grazing areas over this period for all farms exceeding 50 hectares, and exclude farm
companies and close corporations (Van Niekerk, 1995). Data used in the models are
presented in the Appendix.
Penson (1987) notes that the more aggregated the financial statements used to calculate farm
sector data, the more biased their interpretation will be. He also points out the importance
of focusing on general trends in financial stress rather than on the specific level of a
particular ratio.
This chapter develops the various models, and interpretation of the empirical results are
discussed under 'Implications and Conclusions'.
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3.1 Aggregate farm bankruptcy model: 1948-1994
The preliminary model for the analysis is given by equation (1):
BANKR = 0,, + 0, POL + 02 RINT + 13, LEV + 04 TPIR + e, (1)
where BANKR = annual rate of total farm bankruptcies (calculated as the ratio of the
number of aggregate bankruptcies to the number of farms in that year); POL = lagged
government policy variable proxy as defined in Section 2.1.3; RINT = lagged real
commercial bank overdraft interest rate (reflecting naive expectations); LEV= lagged farm
sector leverage ratio; TPIR = lagged drought index, and et = disturbance term. Correlation
coefficients were used to identify the appropriate length of lag for the explanatory variables.
3.1.1 Correlation coefficients
A correlation matrix of the variables considered for the aggregate model is presented in
Table 3.1. All coefficient signs agree with a priori expectations. Double natural logarithmic
specification increased significance of the coefficients of the variables. LBANKR (rate of
total farm bankruptcies logged) is negatively correlated to LPOLl (logged government policy
variable lagged one year) and LTPIR2 (logged total agricultural production index residuals
two years prior), and positively related to LLEV1 (logged leverage variable lagged one year)
and LRINT2 (logged real interest rate two years prior).
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Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels
respectively.
3.1.2 Regression model
The following OLS model was estimated for the aggregate farm bankruptcy model
(SPSS, 1995):
LBANKR = 3,818 - 0,2620 LPOL1 + 0,1198 LRINT2 + 1,7205 LLEV1 - 0,0654 LTPIR2 (2)
(-3,098)*** (2,170)** (18,615)*** (-1,034)
where adjusted R2=90,84 percent, degrees of freedom = 41, d — 1,235, t-values are shown
in parentheses, and *** and ** indicate significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels
respectively.
The coefficients, except for LTPIR2, are statistically significant. LTPIR2 is retained in the
model due to the coefficient's t-value being greater than one (Maddala, 1977: 121).
Multicollinearity is not likely to be a problem due to there being no statistically significant
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pairwise correlations between the explanatory variables. The model in equation (2) was also
estimated in standardised form. Standardised variables are expressed in terms of deviations
from their means (change of origin) and divided by their sample standard deviation (change
of scale); therefore the standardised variables have a zero mean value and a variance of one
(Gujarati, 1995: 182). Thus, standardised variables are independent of the original units of
measurement, and their coefficients show the relative importance of the variables, which is
important for policy purposes. The standardised aggregate farm bankruptcy model is
estimated as:
ZLBANKR = - 0,147 ZLPOL1 + 0,103 2LR1NT2 + 0,877 7J.I.F.V1 - 0,049 ZLTPIR2 (3)
The leverage ratio, ZLLEV1, is the most important explanatory variable in equation (3),
followed by lagged real government subsidies, ZLPOL1, lagged real interest rates,
ZLRINT2, and lagged supply shocks, ZLTPIR2.
Attempts were made to fit an interaction term to the model to determine the effects of real
interest rates on leverage and hence bankruptcy. Due to multicollinearity, induced by the
interaction term on the model, principal component analysis was used (Kendall, 1957;
Chatterjee and Price, 1977; Doran, 1989). Principal component analysis converts the
original set of variables into a new set of uncorrelated variables called principal components,
which are linear combinations of the original variables. The component loadings (principal
component coefficients) are chosen so that the principal components satisfy two conditions;
the principal components are orthogonal, and they are ordered; the first principal component
accounts for the maximum possible proportion of the total variation of the original variables,
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the second principal component accounts for the maximum of the remaining variation in the
original variables, and so on. By deleting subsets of principal components, more stable
coefficient estimates of the explanatory variables can be obtained (Jolliffe, 1986: 132).
The aggregate model did not stabilise with the correct coefficient signs, probably due to the
lack of variability of the bankruptcy variable between 1948 and 1970. The aggregate farm
bankruptcy model was then analysed for the period 1970 to 1994 (to be consistent with the
product sector models).
3.2 Aggregate farm bankruptcy model: 1970-1994
The preliminary aggregate farm bankruptcy model is given by equation (4):
BANKR = 0,, + 0, POL + 02 RINT + 03 LEV + 04 TPIR + 05IL + e, (4)
where BANKR, POL, RINT, LEV and TPIR are defined as before; IL = interaction term
(product of RINT and LEV showing how higher real interest rates reduce asset values and
hence increase leverage and potential bankruptcy); and et = disturbance term. Correlation
coefficients were used to identify the appropriate length of lag for the explanatory variables.
3.2.1 Correlation coefficients
A correlation matrix of the model variables is shown in Table 3.2. All correlation coefficient
signs agree with a priori expectations. Annual bankruptcy, BANKR, is negatively correlated
with POLl (government policy lagged on year) and TPIRl (total production index residuals
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lagged one year), and positively correlated with LEVl (leverage in previous year), RINT2
(real commercial bank interest rate two years prior) and IL21 (RINT2 x LEVl).
Multicollinearity is likely to be a problem due to statistically significant pairwise correlations
between the explanatory variables.



































Note: *** and ** indicate significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels respectively.
3.2.2 Regression model
The initial estimated OLS aggregate farm bankruptcy model (GENSTAT, 1993) was:
BANKR = 0,199 - 0,0003 POL1 - 0,009 RINT2 + 0,001 TPIR1 + 2,182 LEVl + 0,202 IL21 (5)
(-6,122)"' (-0,397) (0,287) (1,940)' (0,649)
where adjusted R2 = 86,55 percent, d = 1,920, degrees of freedom = 17, t-values are in
parentheses, and *** and * indicate significance at the 1 and 10 percent levels respectively.
Expected multicollinearity occurs in equation (5) as there is a high adjusted R2, the
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coefficients of variables RINT2, TPIR1 and IL21 are not statistically significant, and the
RINT2 and TPIR1 coefficients have the wrong sign. Principal components (PCs) extracted
from the standardised explanatory variables (ZPOL1, etc.) to cope with this problem are
shown in Table 3.3. The Durbin-Watson d statistic for detecting autocorrelation indicates
there is no first-order autocorrelation, so the hypothesis of randomness is accepted (Gujarati,
1995: 423).




















































The principal components (PCs) are used to restate equation (5) in terms of the original
variables purged of multicollinearity (Chatterjee and Price, 1977; Doran, 1989).
Standardised annual aggregate farm bankruptcy, ZBANKR, is first regressed on all the
principal components. Successive principal components with small variances are dropped
until the sign and magnitude of the estimated standardised coefficients stabilise. This resulted
in ZBANKR being regressed on PC] and PC2. These two PCs explain most (75,71 percent)
of the variation in the explanatory variables (principal components PC3, PC4 and PC5 were
omitted as they showed the linear relationships between the explanatory variables which were
the source of the multicollinearity, and resulted in instability in the model).
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ZBANKR = 0,457 PC, + 0,543 PC2 (6)
(9,451)"" (5,906)'"
where adjusted R2 = 84,70 percent, d = 1,926, degrees of freedom = 20, t-values are in
parentheses, and *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
The Durbin-Watson d statistic for detecting autocorrelation still indicates there is no first-
order autocorrelation, so the hypothesis of randomness is again accepted. Standardised
annual aggregate farm bankruptcy could also be estimated by OLS regression of ZBANKR
on the standardised explanatory variables as per equation (7):
ZBANKR = 0, ZPOL1 + (3, ZRINT2 + 03 ZLEV1 + ft, ZTPIR1 + Bs ZIL21 (7)
Chatterjee and Price (1977: 176) show that the /3 coefficients of equation (7) can be estimated
from equation (6) coefficients and the PC! and PC2 loadings in Table 3.3 as:
k
Pi = I aifn m
where â  = estimated loading for variable i in PCj, Cy = estimated coefficient for PCj from
equation (6), and k = number of PCs retained. For example, (3{= (-0,32125 x 0,457) +
(-0,87150 x 0,543) = -0,620.
Substituting these expressions into equation (7) gives the estimated standardised aggregate
farm bankruptcy regression model as:
ZBANKR = -0,620 ZPOL1 + 0,051 ZR1NT2 + 0,312 ZLEV1 - 0,061 ZTPIR] + 0,123 ZIL21 (9)
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The government subsidy variable, ZPOL1, is the most important explanatory variable,
followed by lagged leverage, ZLEV1, the interaction term, ZIL21, lagged total production
index residuals, ZTPIR1, and lagged real interest rates, ZRINT2. Variances and hence
standard errors and t-values of the 0 coefficients are estimated following Gujarati (1995: 70):
Var (0} = I (a/ * Var (ClJ)) <io)
j='
where ay = estimated loading for variable i in PCj( Var (Cy) = variance of the estimated
coefficient for PC, from equation (6), and k = number of PCs retained.
The t-values are equivalent to those in original scale since scaling does not affect the
correlation of the variables. Finally, the regression coefficients in equation (9) are multiplied
by <SBANKR/SXi (standard deviation of BANKR divided by standard deviation of the relevant
explanatory variable) to express the amended OLS annual aggregate farm bankruptcy model
in original scale (Chatterjee and Price, 1977: 178), as per equation (11):
BANKR = 0,315 - 0,0004 POL1 + 0,003 RINT2 + 1,631 LEV1 - 0,002 TPIR1 + 0,036 IL21 (11)
(-7,596)"" (1,263) (11,056)"" (-2,758)"" (3,602)""
where adjusted R2= 84,70 percent, t-values are shown in parentheses, and *** indicates
significance at the 1 percent level.
Comparing equations (11) and (5), the adjusted R2 falls slightly but the t-values increase
markedly. All coefficients are now highly statistically significant, except for RINT2, which
has a t-value greater than one and is therefore retained in the model (Maddala, 1977: 121).
The RINT2 and TPIR1 coefficient signs are correct in the amended model.
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3.3 Maize farm bankruptcy model: 1970-1994
The preliminary maize bankruptcy model is given by equation (12):
BANKRM = ft + ft RMP + ft WEA + ft LEV +ft RINT + ft IL + ft RBP + e, (12)
where BANKRM = annual number of maize farm bankruptcies; RMP = lagged real maize
producer price; WEA = lagged annual rainfall in summer grain areas (annual rainfall is used
because of the importance of soil moisture levels in maize production) (CCWR, 1996); LEV
= lagged farm sector leverage; RINT = lagged real commercial bank overdraft interest rate
(again reflecting naive expectations); IL = interaction term (RINT x LEV, showing how
higher real interest rates reduce asset values and hence increase leverage and potential
bankruptcy); RBP = lagged real producer beef price, and et = disturbance term. LEV is
a reasonable proxy for maize farm leverage as farm debt is concentrated in the summer
rainfall and cattle grazing areas (Volkskas Bank, 1988; Human, 1989).
3.3.1 Correlation coefficients
A correlation matrix of the maize farm bankruptcy model variables is shown in Table 3.4.
All correlation coefficient signs agree with a priori expectations. Annual bankruptcy,
BANKRM, is negatively correlated with RMP1 (real maize producer price in previous year),
RBPl (real beef price in previous year) and WEAl (annual rainfall in previous year), but
positively correlated with LEV1 (leverage in previous year), RINT2 (real commercial bank
interest rate two years prior) and IL21 (RINT2 x LEV1). Again, multicollinearity is likely
to be a problem due to statistically significant pairwise correlations between the explanatory
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variables.










































Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels
respectively.
3.3.2 Regression model
The initial estimated OLS maize farm bankruptcy model (GENSTAT, 1993) was:
BANKRM = 30,427 - 0,202 RMP1 + 0,012 WEA1 + 945,783 LEV] + 2,935 R1NT2 + 27,568 1L21 + 0,023 RBP1 (13)
(-1,615) (0,154) (3,515)"' (0,277) (0,407) (0,193)
where adjusted R2 = 75,87 percent, d = 1,077, degrees of freedom = 16, t-values are in
parentheses, and *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
Expected multicollinearity occurs in equation (13) as there is a high adjusted R2, the
coefficients of variables RMP1, WEA1, RINT2, IL21 and RBP1 are not statistically
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significant, and the WEA1 and RBP1 coefficients have the wrong sign. Principal
components extracted from the standardised explanatory variables (ZRMP1, etc.) to cope
with this problem are shown in Table 3.5. The Durbin-Watson d statistic for detecting
autocorrelation falls in the inconclusive range, but the non-parametric Geary test passed at
the 5 percent significance level, so the hypothesis of randomness is accepted (Gujarati, 1995:
419).

































































The principal components (PCs) are used to restate equation (13) in terms of the original
variables purged of multicollinearity. Standardised annual maize farm bankruptcy,
ZBANKRM, is first regressed on PCl5 PC2 and PC3. These three PCs explain most (87,29
percent) of the variation in the explanatory variables (principal components PC4, PC5 and PC6
were omitted as they showed the linear relationships between the explanatory variables which
were the source of the multicollinearity, and resulted in instability in the model).
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ZBANKRM = - 0.444 PC, + 0,217 PC\ - 0,231 PC, (14)
(-6,940)"" (2,010)" (-1,770)"
where adjusted R2 = 70,40 percent, d = 0,991, degrees of freedom = 19, t-values are in
parentheses, and *** and * indicate significance at the 1 percent and 10 percent levels
respectively.
The Durbin-Watson d statistic falls in the inconclusive range (1 percent significance level),
and the hypothesis of randomness is still accepted as the Geary test passed at the 1 percent
significance level.
Following the same procedure outlined in equation (8), the standardised maize farm
bankruptcy model was estimated as:
ZBANKRM = - 0,271 ZRMP1 - 0,233 ZWEA1 + 0,356 ZLEV1 + 0,107 ZR1NT2 + 0,123 ZIL21 - 0,127 ZRBP1 (IS)
The leverage ratio, ZLEV1, is the most important explanatory variable, followed by the
lagged real maize producer price, ZRMP1, lagged annual rainfall, ZWEA1, lagged real beef
price, ZRBP1, the interaction term, ZIL21, and lagged real interest rate, ZRINT2. The
amended OLS annual maize farm bankruptcy model in original scale was then estimated as
follows:
BANKRM = 244,800 - 0,235 RMP1 - 0,140 WEA1 + 612,818 LEV1 + 1,840 RINT2 + 14,265 IL21 - 0,082 RBP1 (16)
(-2,921)"' (-2,779)" (4,271)"" (1,933)" (2,512)" (-1,816)"
where adjusted R2= 70,40 percent, t-values are shown in parentheses, and ***, ** and *
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indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels respectively.
Comparing equations (16) and (13), the adjusted R2 falls slightly but the t-values increase
markedly. All coefficients are now statistically significant and the WEA1 and RBP1
coefficient signs are correct.
3.4 Extensive beef farm bankruptcy model: 1970-1994
The preliminary OLS model is given by equation (17):
BANKRB = 00 + 0, RBP + 02 RINT + 03 LEV + 04 WEA + 0, RBS + &6IL + e{ (17)
where BANKRB = annual number of bankrupt extensive beef farmers; RBP = lagged real
beef producer price; RINT = lagged real commercial bank overdraft interest rate (again
showing naive expectations); LEV = lagged farm sector leverage ratio; WEA = lagged
annual rainfall in cattle grazing area (CCWR, 1996); RBS = lagged real stockfeed subsidies
and transport rebates; IL = lagged interaction term (product of lagged RINT and lagged
LEV, showing that higher real interest rates reduce asset values and hence raise leverage and
potential bankruptcy), and et = disturbance term. LEV is again a reasonable proxy for
extensive beef farm leverage as farm debt is concentrated in the summer rainfall and cattle
grazing areas (Volkskas Bank, 1988; Human, 1989). Correlation coefficients were used to
identify the most appropriate length of lag for the factors affecting BANKRB.
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3.4.1 Correlation coefficients
A correlation matrix of the extensive beef farm bankruptcy model variables is shown in
Table 3.6. BANKRB is negatively related to RBP1 (real beef price lagged one year, at the
15 percent significance level) and WEA4 (annual rainfall four years prior), but positively
related to RINT3 (real interest rates lagged three years), LEV3 (farm leverage lagged three
years), RBS3 (real beef subsidies lagged three years) and IL43 (product of real interest rates
lagged four years and leverage lagged three years). These coefficient signs agree with a
priori expectations. Multicollihearity is again likely to be a problem due to statistically
significant pairwise correlations between most of the explanatory variables.










































Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels
respectively.
The three and four year lags in the explanatory variables are expected as beef herds take
from three to four years to build up (Directorate Agricultural Statistics, 1996). A real
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interest rate increase, for example, would therefore probably take a number of years to
impact on fanners' destocking decisions.
3.4.2 Regression model
The initial extensive beef farm bankruptcy model estimated by OLS (GENSTAT, 1993) was:
BANKRB = 13.463 - 0,042 RBP1 + 0,513 RINT3 + 318,178 LEV3 - 0,006 WEA4 + 0,095 RBS3 - 2,472 RA3 (18)
(-1,855)" (0,931) (4,497)*" (-0,372) (2,006)" (-0,678)
where adjusted R2 = 86,40 percent, d = 1,544, degrees of freedom = 14, t-values are in
parentheses, and *** and * indicate significance at the 1 percent and 10 percent levels
respectively.
Expected multicollinearity occurs in equation (18) as the IL43 coefficient is not statistically
significant and has the wrong sign. The model has a high adjusted R2 but the coefficients
of variables RINT3 and WEA4 are not statistically significant. The Durbin-Watson d statistic
falls in the inconclusive range, but the hypothesis of randomness is accepted (the Geary test
passed at the 5 percent significance level). Extracted principal components to remedy
multicollinearity are shown in Table 3.7.
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Standardised annual beef farm bankruptcy, ZBANKRB, is regressed on PQ and PC2. These
two PCs explain 71 percent of the variation in the explanatory variables (the other
components, as sources of the multicollinearity, were omitted), as per equation (19):
ZBANKRB = - 0,504 PC, - 0,115 PC2
(-7,665)"" (-1,152)
(19)
where adjusted R2 = 74,40 percent, d = 1,082, degrees of freedom = 18, t-values are in
parentheses, and *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
The Durbin-Watson d statistic falls in the inconclusive range (5 percent significance level),
and the hypothesis of randomness is still accepted as the Geary test again passed at the 5
percent level.
Following the same procedure outlined in equation (8), the standardised beef farm bankruptcy
model was estimated as:
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ZBANKRB = - 0,195 ZRBP1 + 0,234 ZRINT3 + 0,251 ZLEV3 - 0,251 ZWEA4 + 0,151 ZRBS3 + 0,161 ZIL43 (20)
Lagged leverage, ZLEV3, and lagged annual rainfall, ZWEA4, are the most important
explanatory variables, followed by the lagged real interest rate, ZRINT3, lagged real beef
producer price, ZRBP1, the interaction term, ZIL43, and lagged real subsidies ZRBS3. The
amended OLS beef farm bankruptcy model in original scale was then estimated as:
BANKRB = 42,269 - 0,036 RBP1 + 1,130 RINT3 + 126,473 LEV3 - 0,035 WEA4 + 0,053 RBS3 + 5,367 IL43 (21)
(-2,476)" (7,717)'" (7,744)"" (-6,603)"* (2,798)'" (3,848)"'
where adjusted R2= 74,40 percent, t-values are shown in parentheses, and *** and **
indicate significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels respectively.
When equations (18) and (21) are compared, the adjusted R2 falls but remains relatively high,
the t-values increase markedly and all estimated coefficients are highly statistically
significant.
The regression coefficient estimates in equations (11), (16) and (21) are biased as some
information was lost by dropping respective principal components, but the new estimates are
more precise (smaller mean square errors) than the OLS estimates in equations (5), (13) and
(18) respectively (McCallum, 1970; Chatterjee and Price, 1977: 175; Doran, 1989: 106).
Therefore, in this study, principal component regression offers an option for improving upon
conventional estimation techniques in overcoming multicollinearity.
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IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The aggregate farm bankruptcy rate in South Africa for the period 1948 to 1994 was
positively related to the lagged aggregate farm debt/asset (leverage) ratio, lagged real interest
rates (financial risk factors), and drought conditions, and negatively related to real
agricultural subsidies (business risk factors). An aggregate model for the period 1970 to
1994 showed similar results; however, farm bankruptcy was also positively related to an
interaction term between real interest rates and the aggregate farm leverage ratio, which
captured how rising real interest rates increase leverage (reduce asset values) and hence the
likelihood of bankruptcy.
Higher lagged aggregate farm debt/asset ratios and lagged real interest rates (financial risk),
and lower annual rainfall (business risk) increased bankruptcies of South African maize and
extensive beef farmers over the period 1970 to 1994. Farm bankruptcies in both sectors
were also negatively related to the lagged real producer prices (business risk). Bankruptcy
of extensive beef farmers was positively related to lagged real stockfeed purchase subsidies
and transport rebates (business risk). Bankruptcies of both farm types were positively related
to an interaction term between real interest rates and the aggregate leverage ratio.
Bankruptcy is therefore a dynamic process, with a time lag between the incidence of these
factors and ultimate farm failure. Lags for the extensive beef farmers are longer than for
maize farmers, probably due to the longer production cycle for beef and beef farmers being
able to increase liquidity via stock sales.
When estimated standardised coefficients for the four models are compared, the aggregate
56
farm debt/asset ratio is the most important determinant of farm bankruptcies (except for the
aggregate model, 1970 to 1994, where the aggregate farm debt/asset ratio was the second
most important explanatory variable). Shepard and Collins (1982) and Chan and Rotenberg
(1988) both showed leverage was an important determinant of farm bankruptcy in the US and
Canada respectively. Higher leverage probably reflects a combination of (1) poor borrowing
decisions by eventual bankrupts, (2) past tax policy measures (for example, accelerated
depreciation allowances on machinery investments) which may have contributed to increased
debt use and farm bankruptcies, and (3) past monetary policy (negative real interest rates)
which made borrowing attractive.
The next most important factor affecting aggregate bankruptcy was real government support
(subsidies). There was a negative relationship between aggregate farm bankruptcy and
government support (lagged one year). Therefore, government supports in one year may
forestall farm bankruptcies in the short-term, delaying bankruptcies to later years.
The adjusted R2 for all four models is relatively high (ranging from 70,40 percent to 90,84
percent), indicating a good fit by the chosen explanatory variables. Variation not accounted
for by the explanatory variables may be partly due to characteristics of individual farmers
(for example, poor financial management skills) which could not be quantified.
Changes in Maize Board maize producer price policy from 1987/88 created another source
of risk for maize farmers to manage as lower real maize prices led to more bankruptcies.
Recent further deregulation of domestic maize pricing means that maize farmers must give
more attention to managing price risk, possibly by forward contracting, electronic marketing,
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hedging a portion of their maize crop via futures contracts on the new South African Futures
Exchange (SAFEX) or enterprise diversification. Producer price and rainfall effects on
extensive beef farmers emphasise the need to build up fodder banks to counter drought, and
possibly use forward contracting and hedging a portion of their intended beef sales via the
recently introduced beef futures contracts to manage price risk.
A positive relationship between bankruptcy rates and government support (stockfeed purchase
subsidies and transport rebates) intended to help extensive beef farmers led to more risk and
potential bankruptcy for some' of these farmers in the long-term. Input subsidies are
perceived by policy makers as helping farmers to reduce production costs. However, this
could have led to beef production in less suitable areas with less comparative advantage, and
hence more farm bankruptcies.
Macroeconomic policy changes towards more market-related real interest rates directly
affected commercial farmers by raising financing costs and indirectly raising leverage and
potential bankruptcy. Stable monetary policy over time can thus contribute to stability in the
agricultural sector, particularly for indebted maize and beef farmers. Highly leveraged
farmers are particularly vulnerable to higher interest rates associated with deflationary
monetary policy. Farmers must closely monitor changes in agricultural price, trade and
macroeconomic policies in order to form accurate expectations of potential bankruptcy causes
and improve management of debt and business and financial risk at farm level. Extension
personnel, consultants and lenders need to advise clients on the relationship between net farm
income, interest costs and leverage levels for successful debt management. Farmers could
use improved information now available from local researchers on forecasting short-term
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regional weather patterns to better manage recurring droughts (for example, reduce fertilizer
input at planting if below average rainfall is expected).
Available data limited the study to analysis of farm bankruptcies at aggregate, maize and
extensive beef sector level, but more research is needed on why bankruptcies occurred in
other enterprise types in South Africa (for example, wool and dairy). More research is also
needed on the individual characteristics of bankrupt farmers. For example, are farmers
operating relatively larger farms going bankrupt? and are younger, more leveraged farmers,
or those less able to manage business and financial risk, failing? These important
unanswered questions stress the need for improved cross-section and time series data bases
on individual farmer attributes.
If highly leveraged farmers have borrowed more debt than they can realistically service in
a changing agricultural and macroeconomic policy environment, major financial restructuring
must occur. Therefore, the rise in farm bankruptcies in South Africa during 1948 to 1994
may have been a necessary financial adjustment for South African agriculture.
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SUMMARY
Commercial farm bankruptcies in South Africa have increased sharply over the period 1948
to 1994 against a background of rising debt levels, fluctuating real interest rates, drought and
declining real government support. Aggregate farm bankruptcies rose from 0,016 percent
of all farms in 1948 (18 farms) to 0,632 percent of all farms in 1994 (389 farms). The
increase has been particularly marked since the 1980s. The annual number of maize farms
and extensive beef farms declared bankrupt in South Africa rose sharply from 1970 to 1994.
Bankrupt maize farms increased from 16 to around 150 farms per year over this period,
while bankrupt extensive beef farms increased from 12 to about 50 per year over the same
period. While the rate of bankruptcies is relatively low, the substantial rise in the number
of bankrupt farms is of concern.
Farm bankruptcy is costly and gives rise to demands for government assistance to alleviate
financial stress for farmers and to provide relief for creditors, so it is appropriate to ask why
these farmers failed. Research into farm bankruptcy can thus help to identify appropriate
future policy and management measures. Past farm bankruptcy studies in developed
countries and farm bankruptcy and farm financial stress studies in South Africa show similar
trends in, and causes of, farm bankruptcies.
The object of this study was to identify factors affecting aggregate, maize and extensive beef
farm bankruptcy in South Africa. These factors were separated into business risk and
financial risk components. Business risk refers to risk inherent in a business independent of
the way the business is financed and is reflected in the variability of net operating income.
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Financial risk reflects added variability of net cash flows arising from fixed financial
obligations associated with debt financing.
Due to data availability and enterprise importance, aggregate farm bankruptcies were
modelled for the period 1948 to 1994, maize and extensive beef farm bankruptcies were
analysed for 1970 to 1994, and for comparison with the product sector models, aggregate
farm bankruptcies were also modelled between 1970 and 1994.
Farm bankruptcy amongst aggregate, maize and extensive beef farms was positively related
to higher lagged aggregate farm debt/asset ratios and lagged real interest rates (financial risk
factors). Lower lagged annual rainfall due to recurring drought (business risk factor)
increased the likelihood of farm bankruptcy. In the aggregate model, increased government
support (business risk factor) reduced farm bankruptcy in the short-term. Stockfeed purchase
subsidies and transport rebates (business risk factor) increased extensive beef farm
bankruptcies in the long-term. A decrease in real maize and beef producer prices (business
risk factors) led to an increase in maize farm bankruptcies, while lower real producer prices
increased the likelihood of extensive beef farm bankruptcies. Therefore, changes in Maize
Board maize producer price policy from 1987/88 created another source of risk for maize
farmers to manage. Beef and maize farmers should therefore give more attention to
managing price risk via methods such as forward contracting or futures contracts. An
interaction term capturing the effects of changes in real interest rates on asset values,
leverage and potential bankruptcy, significantly increased bankruptcies in the product sector
and aggregate models from 1970 to 1994.
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Farmers will need to closely monitor agricultural policy and macroeconomic trends to form
accurate expectations of potential bankruptcy causes. This, in turn, can lead to improved
management of debt and business and financial risk at farm level. The sharp rise in farm
bankruptcies in South Africa in the past may have been an unavoidable financial adjustment
in response to high aggregate farm leverage levels which could not be sustained.
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Sources: Central Statistical Service (1964, 1972, 1994 and 1995); Directorate Agricultural
Economic Trends (1971 and 1995); Directorate Agricultural Statistics (1996).
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Sources: Directorate Agricultural Economic Trends (1971 and 1995); Directorate Agricultural
Statistics (1996); South African Reserve Bank (various years).
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